LLMS are increasingly used to generate policy code for organizational security, compliance and operations, with the aim of boosting efficiency but often delivering semantically incorrect results that still look valid. According to SecurityWeek, researchers such as Vatsal Gupta warn that a missing condition, misinterpreted attribute, or incorrect action can redefine who gets access, even when the policy compiles and appears correct.
Recurring failure patterns include missing contextual restraints that make a policy apply globally instead of within a defined scope, missing deny logic that undermines the baseline of restricted access, and hallucinations where the model invents attributes that do not exist in the actual system schema. Temporal and contextual conditions are often dropped, turning time-bound access into always-on access, and action misclassification can broaden a restricted operation.
The article argues that while abandoning LLMs is not necessary, organisations must adopt validation layers between generation and enforcement, test policies rather than merely compiling them, and enforce deny-by-default to treat authorization logic as a high-risk domain. March 30, 2026.