Security AffairsPierluigi Paganini
Hunt.io uncovers credential theft targeting US bank accounts
Hunt[.]io has disclosed a Russian-speaking credential-theft operation that compromised 603 Windows PCs and exposed login data for bank, government and password management services. The investigators found an exposed open directory on a Netherlands VPS containing the operation’s live loot store, including decrypted password-manager vaults, cleartext bank logins and accounts linked to federal identity gateways such as ID[.]me and Login[.]gov. Importantly, no bank or agency was breached directly; the compromise occurred on victims’ own devices.
Three bespoke tools drove the operation: HavoX for command and control communications and remote execution, Phantom53 for victim and task management, and Kraken Bridge for delivering commands via temporary download links. HavoX used encrypted channels and hidden Python scripts; Phantom53 tracked infected devices; Kraken Bridge issued instructions and fielded tasks.
Between October 12 and the reporting period, the 603 compromised hosts generated more than 1.2 million connections across three command-and-control systems. At least 57 victims had US bank or government credentials stored on their machines, with 46 accounts tied to federal benefits or identity services. The attackers even cracked a LastPass vault offline, recovering 2,880 logins, including access to a bank account, the IRS and the vault’s sharing key.
They also bypassed Chrome’s app-bound encryption using hardcoded AES-GCM keys for Chrome v20 and v21, and searched stolen cookies for 28 high-value services, including Google, Anthropic, Binance, PayPal and several banks.
The operators relied on legitimate remote-access tools, such as ConnectWise ScreenConnect and Level[.]io, to maintain access. The report’s authors state the attribution rests on the operators’ own files, with Russian-language logs and comments found in 249 files. Hunt[.]io’s recommendations focus on treating AI CLI credential files like SSH keys, enforcing device-state–based conditional access, and alerting on pythonw.exe spawning from unusual locations. None of the institutions were breached; the exposure was live customer access enabling account takeover.