The Hacker News
eMudhra revokes eight more CAs after key handling flaw
eMudhra has revoked eight additional intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) after its internal investigation into an October 2026 key compromise found a fault in a Python script that affected the keys. Each of the eight compromised intermediates held its own private key used to sign certificates; six were TLS (website) certs and two were code-signing certificates.
The company says the eight were initially deemed unaffected, but an automated read-back step during a key ceremony revealed that for eight ECDSA keys a single line in the script truncated the private value to its leading byte, enabling a weak copy of the key to be used for signing. The eight RSA keys underwent the same process; in total, 195 certificates were affected, with 29 of those tied to the company's own domains.
The revocation occurred late last week, with the certificates listed under the designation cessationOfOperation rather than the prior key-compromise code.
The incident traces back to a key ceremony on 30 April 2025, when 16 CA keys were generated on Utimaco HSMs for Crypto4A devices at US and EU sites. The company states the HSMs themselves worked correctly; the fault lies with the script and process controls around handling keys, including bypassed CPS rules on transporting keys between HSMs. Mozilla’s bug tracker, incident reports, and its own audit notes are cited as the primary evidence.
Microsoft will remove the eight roots, including emSign Root CA – G1, from 16 November, with Chrome and Firefox discontinuing G1 issuance by 16 November and Apple dropping all G1 trust by 30 November. The company says it will publish the full inventory and is awaiting KPMG’s independent review due by 4 December.