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FortiGuard tracks SQL Server attacks deploying Gh0st RAT and XMRig
FortiGuard Labs has disclosed an active T-SQL malware campaign that brute-forces exposed Microsoft SQL Server instances over the internet on TCP port 1433. The operation begins with a 64-bit Go binary packed with UPX (versions 3.9–5.21) running on an already compromised Windows host. This dllhost.exe binary embeds the Naabu port scanner and a 2,700-password dictionary to identify reachable SQL servers.
After a login succeeds, the malware uses a T-SQL script to enable xp_cmdshell and Ole Automation Procedures, then downloads eight supporting files (including 2018.sql, dwm.exe, go.bat, go.vbs, out.bat, user.txt, pass.txt, and sqlcmd.exe) to the local temp folder and creates a scheduled task running every 30 minutes under a Microsoft Edge update guise to remain persistent. The scanner also performs a /16 CIDR subnet derivation from the discovered target IP and logs open hosts to Result.txt.
Once a SQL server is compromised, the second stage uses a .NET utility (CSQL.exe via dwm.exe) to brute-force accounts such as sa and admin with the 2,700-strong password list. A login leads to a remote script execution that downloads and launches a loader (Secs.exe) from the attacker’s FTP server. The loader enables a secondary payload chain, including an XMRig Monero miner and a Gh0st RAT variant.
The Gh0st payload, named winlogon.exe, persists via HKLM Run, a Windows service, and a 30-minute scheduled task, and performs up to 30 control commands, keylogging, screen capture, and file exfiltration from Tencent QQ directories, while the miner reports hash rates to the operator.
FortiGuard Labs notes at least one compromised Intel Xeon server in the United States, with no total victim count published. Attribution remains unconfirmed for a named group, though the indicators point to a financially motivated, Chinese-speaking operator.
Defences highlighted include restricting TCP 1433 exposure, enforcing strong sa passwords, disabling xp_cmdshell and Ole Automation Procedures where feasible, auditing Task Scheduler for rogue Microsoft_UPDATES tasks, and monitoring the C:\Users\Public directory for unexpected payloads.