The Hacker News
Kaspersky uncovers GitDoor and GraphDoor cloud backdoors
Kaspersky researchers Saurabh Sharma and Noushin Shabab have disclosed a campaign tracked as Operation ShadowCloud, in which an active intrusion targets government-linked organisations in Asia and Africa by deploying two undocumented backdoors, GraphDoor and GitDoor, that piggyback on legitimate cloud services for command-and-control.
The attackers allegedly initiate with a MeshCentral Agent, a legitimate remote‑access tool, and then leverage a hard‑coded C2 endpoint (wss://27.102.66[.]162:443/agent[.]ashx) to fetch three payloads: a DLL sideloading loader, a second loader, and an encrypted core payload. The first loader uses a hybrid RC4 stream cipher with an XOR mask, while the second loader relies on a straight XOR, according to Kaspersky’s analysis. The implants then execute in memory to drop backdoors that conceal C2 traffic behind cloud services and enable on‑demand plugin delivery.
GitDoor communicates via GitHub for C2, using two repositories: /repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Havo for commands and /repos/LatonyCharnleyaW/Trix for results. Havo is public, while Trix is private. GraphDoor, by contrast, opens a named pipe, creates a directory named Intel_Log in the Application Data folder, and exchanges data with a malicious app authenticated via login.microsoftonline[.]com over port 443, subsequently staging data on Microsoft Graph and SharePoint.
The GraphDoor plugins include kl[.]ts (keystrokes), pr[.]ts (process listing), scr[.]ts (screenshots), and additional modules for proxying, Mimikatz‑based credential access, registry enumeration, scheduled tasks, and more. The authors claim the actors blend in with normal traffic by abusing cloud APIs and enable rapid payload updates without host‑file modifications. The researchers note some tactical overlap with Bronze Sandcastle and other China‑nexus groups, suggesting a possible shared development lineage.