Dark ReadingNate Nelson
Brazilian Signature Extensions Exposed to Critical RCE Flaws
Researchers at Bay Area Labs flagged five widely used Brazilian browser extensions that underpin the country’s digital signature infrastructure, revealing critical remote code execution vulnerabilities that could allow attacker-controlled websites to run arbitrary code on users’ machines.
The extensions—Lacuna Web PKI, Softplan Web Signer, Certisign WebSigner, Certisign CertiPlugin, and BRy Assinatura Digital—have more than 10 million installations and are used by government agencies, tax professionals, and high-value organisations to sign official documents with ICP-Brasil certificates.
The researchers disclosed that each extension permitted the signing middleware to load dynamic libraries (DLLs) from websites, and if those libraries were not properly trusted, an attacker luring a victim to a malicious site could trigger malware loading and coerce the signing tool to process fraudulent signatures.
All five RCE flaws were rated critical, each scoring 9.6 under CVSS, and were patched by mid-September 2026. The vulnerability family hinges on insufficient validation of loaded cryptographic libraries, with attackers able to direct the extension to load untrusted DLLs, potentially enabling forged documents or breaches of major government bodies and professionals handling large volumes of sensitive personal, financial, tax, and health information.
CertiPlugin was the only extension with any domain allowlist, and it oddly permitted any domain ending in .one, meaning an attacker could obtain a freely available domain to exploit the weakness. Arnott from Bay Area Labs cautions that the same pattern—allowing sites to choose which DLLs to load—has appeared in signing tools used by other governments in Europe and the Middle East.
Attackers could have exploited these flaws to compromise officials, lawyers, doctors, accountants, and other professionals who manage digital signing credentials on single workstations, enabling impersonation in legally significant transactions. The report underscores the scale of potential impact given the user base, which includes Brazil’s Federal Senate, the National Council of Justice, the navy, and major financial and educational institutions.
The article notes that the signing tools’ friction-reducing design choices—while intended to support hardware security tokens and drivers—have repeatedly led to insecure loading of DLLs, a lesson that remains despite the patches. The researchers’ disclosures emphasize the ongoing risk to Brazil’s high-value digital signing ecosystem.