SecurelistSaurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab
Cloud based backdoors target government networks in Asia and Africa
In early 2026, Securelist’s GReAT researchers tracked Operation ShadowCloud, a cloud service–based intrusion campaign that uses MeshAgent to drop two backdoors, GitDoor and GraphDoor, with C2 traffic camouflaged behind Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub and Ably.
The Part 1 report concentrates on the initial infection vector and the GitDoor backdoor, detailing how two MeshCentral Agent instances were deployed within a Taiwanese government‑linked organisation and how the attackers used trusted binaries to sideload malicious loaders. The loaders decrypt and inject the backdoor payload into memory, using methods such as an RC4 plus XOR hybrid (Loader Type 1) and a second loader that uses a different API resolution approach (Loader Type 2). The campaign leverages a modified Erfrp client and Ably‑based plug‑ins to proxy traffic between infected hosts and its C2 servers.
GitDoor’s backdoor decrypts configuration data to contact two GitHub repositories under LatonyCharnleyaW: Havo (download) and Trix (upload). It also connects to Ably at rest via a hardcoded token, and then composes and exfiltrates victim information—encrypted with AES‑256‑ECB and further wrapped by XOR with a filename—into both the Ably cloud and GitHub.
The malware pollutes C2 channels by periodically uploading and retrieving command data, downloading plug‑ins (scr[.]ts and pr[.]ts) from GitHub, and launching a two‑stage decryption routine to unpack shellcode into memory. Command data and outputs are stored in separate repositories (Havo for inputs, Trix for results) and are retrieved via uniquely named files, with GitHub issue creation used as a control beacon.
The report notes multiple helper modules and shellcodes, and that victims were primarily in Asia and Africa’s government sector. Part 2 will outline GraphDoor, its plug‑ins (keylogging, screen capture, proxies) and the associated attribution clues pointing to Chinese‑speaking groups.