SecurelistSaurabh Sharma, Noushin Shabab
GraphDoor Backdoor Targets Government Networks Through Cloud Services
Operation ShadowCloud’s second instalment details a modular backdoor chain named GraphDoor, which leverages cloud services as covert C2 channels to target government networks in Asia and Africa. The malware opens a named pipe for inter-process communication, creates a random GUID-based directory under Intel_Log, and harvests system information by resolving Windows APIs at runtime with a DJB2-hashed method.
Victim data—encompassing network adapters, OS version, machine GUID, IPs, user and host names, and running processes—are AES-encrypted and Base64-encoded before being sent to the C2. The initial TLS handshake targets login.microsoftonline[.]com on port 443, after which the malware decrypts hard-coded strings to assemble a client credentials request and obtain an access token for Microsoft Graph. A PUT to a specific SharePoint site then stores an encrypted victim data payload as main.%victim‑unique‑code%.js[.]map in a document library.
GraphDoor then downloads three plug-ins (scr[.]ts, pr[.]ts, kl[.]ts) and loads them in parallel. The plug-ins enable features such as screenshot capture, process listing, and keylogging, with the latter writing data to %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Cache\logs.dat, XOR-encrypting the keystrokes with a 32-byte key masked by a hard-coded key.
The malware uses a mixture of Microsoft Graph, SharePoint lists, and a proxy channel to retrieve commands and files, including additional shellcode and a loader/COFF payload mechanism. Evidence and infrastructure indicators point to overlaps with Chinese-speaking groups; attribution remains uncertain, though links to FamousSparrow and CopperTurtle are discussed. The report also notes shared staging directories and similar beacons, with GraphDoor and GitDoor coexisting in observed environments. Indicators of Compromise cover GraphDoor hashes, SharePoint site buildersemp.sharepoint[.]com, and multiple C2 proxies and domains.