The Hacker News
Claroc Finds 35,578 Grok Built Apps Exposed Without Sign In
Claroc researchers disclosed that over 35,000 Grok-built apps were publicly accessible online out of 37,571 surveyed, with 35,578 left open without requiring sign-in. The exposure spans apps built by staff at X (the social network) and SpaceXSI (the Grok AI developer) and includes a mix of games, landing pages, and calculators, with roughly one in ten containing internal business or personal data.
Among the staff-built apps, there were confidential items such as an onboarding plan for a new sales hire, a sales territory map covering 594 accounts, and an X advertising proposal to a U.S. federal agency marked confidential. SpaceXSI reported that it has since taken down all 24 staff apps, while other users’ apps remain.
Beyond staff projects, the open apps reportedly contained internal data from 30 other organisations, including entities in construction, energy, healthcare and defence, with 26 of these employers exceeding 1,000 staff and six being Fortune 500 companies.
Claroc’s report estimates that about 2% of the open apps carried material rated high or critical, including a hospital group’s searchable list of more than 3,500 employees, an intensive care briefing on a patient, a fire department live shift board, and a contractor’s timesheet where every employee’s password appeared in plain text.
The researchers tested two Grok-hosted apps with “Anyone with the link” access; one allowed data changes without a sign-in, while the other’s sign-in flow could grant access to users outside the owner’s control, demonstrating potential risks even when apps are not public-facing by default. Claroc alerted SpaceXSI and began notifying affected organisations; SpaceXSI did not indicate it would contact other owners.
Claroc advised on how to check organisations’ Grok apps, including reviewing which AI builders staff use, inspecting passive DNS results, enforcing “Invited users” or “Only you” where appropriate, attempting cross-domain sign-in attempts, and unpublishing apps with no owner. SpaceXSI’s stance, and the finding that default or broad-sharing settings can still leave apps exposed, are attributed to the researchers’ observations and the company’s published statements. The piece notes the broader context of app[.]address visibility and DNS lookups as routes to disclosure.