Bug bounty program
FC
Files.com
Most upvoted reports3
| Report | Weakness | Disclosed | Bounty | Votes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| File access controls incorrectly enforced for files shared via QuickLink - Unshared files can be accessedAnalysed#214001 | No weakness recorded | 2017-04-16 | $600 | 29 |
| Existence of Folder path by guessing the path through response#174645 | Information Disclosure | 2017-05-02 | – | 15 |
| CSRF @ configuration#208734 | Cross-Site Request Forgery | 2017-05-27 | – | 8 |
Subdomains3,165
| Name | Scope | First seen |
|---|---|---|
| app.files.com | In scope | 2026-11-14 |
| www.files.com | In scope | 2026-11-14 |
| your-assigned-subdomain.files.com | In scope | 2026-11-14 |
3 names are covered by the program's own scope; 0 were first seen this week. Names come from ProjectDiscovery's public Chaos dataset (passive sources: certificate logs, DNS and other public data), matched to the program by its listing and its own domain scope. A name being in a dataset is not permission to test it: only what the program's own scope says is in scope, and its policy decides. CyberSIXT does not resolve, probe or scan these names. Tags come from the name alone. Source: ProjectDiscovery Chaos. Subdomains on the Atlas, or search the subdomains of every program.
A name in a dataset is not permission to test it: the program's own scope and rules decide. Data as of 2026-11-15.