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Bug bounty reports15,219

Publicly disclosed HackerOne reports, with the platform's own outcome and severity.

Program:Uber
Status
Severity
Weakness:Information Disclosure
Clear
Year
Bounty paid9
Access stated
Access needed
Technique
Clear filters44 of 15,219 reports
Disclosed bug bounty reports
ReportStatusWeaknessSeverityDisclosedBountyVotes
Brute Forcing rider-view Endpoint Allows for Counting Number of Active Uber Drivers#127025InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-06-13–1
Estimation of a Lower Bound on Number of Uber Drivers via Enumeration#125488ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-08-24$5002
Disclosure of ip addresses in local network of uber#126569InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-06-13–2
Enumerating userIDs with phone numbers#128723DuplicateInformation Disclosure–2016-06-11–2
Information disclosure at lite.uber.com#128853InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-06-13–2
Server version disclosure: team.uberinternal.com#146327InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-07-07–2
User Enumeration and Information Disclosure#155578InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-08-12–2
Information Disclosure on lite.uber.com#133375InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-07-07–3
Phone Number Enumeration#138881InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-07-07–3
Disclosure of Co-Rider user (Uber-pooling) profile picture at Amazon AWS Cloudfront within HTTP RESPONSE#789803ValidInformation DisclosureLow2021-02-25–3
LIsting of http://archive.uber.com/pypi/simple/#125068InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-03-24–4
Disclosure of ways to the site root#129027InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-06-13–4
reopen #128853 (Information disclosure at lite.uber.com)#129712N/AInformation Disclosure–2016-07-26–5
Requested and received edit access to Google form#130440ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-07-26–5
lert.uber.com: Few default folders/files of AURA Framework are accessible#195205ValidInformation Disclosure–2018-12-19–5
[experience.uber.com] Node.js source code disclosure & anonymous access to internal Uber documents, templates and tools#389078ValidInformation Disclosure–2021-02-23–5
CSV Injection in business.uber.com#126109ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-04-06$1,0006
ability to retrieve a user's phone-number/email for a given inviteCode#178503ValidInformation Disclosure–2017-05-17–6
stack trace exposed on https://receipts.uber.com/#204568InformativeInformation Disclosure–2021-02-25–8
Information Leak - GitHub - Endpoint Configuration Details#378558ValidInformation Disclosure–2018-08-27–8
Google Maps API Key Leakage#1321830InformativeInformation DisclosureNone2021-09-03–8
Listing of email addresses of whitelisted business users visible at business.uber.com#125246ValidInformation Disclosure–2021-02-25$2509
Bulk UUID enumeration via invite codes#145150ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-09-08–12
Lack of CNAME/A Record Trimming Pointing Uber Domains to Insecure Non-Uber AWS Instances/Sites#125118ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-07-13–13
Lack of rate limiting on get.uber.com leads to enumeration of promotion codes and estimation of a lower bound on the number of Uber drivers#125200ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-08-12$3,00013
Server version disclosure#149483InformativeInformation Disclosure–2016-07-07–13
Full path disclosure on track.uber.com#125197ValidInformation Disclosure–2018-11-20$10014
Exposed Golang Pprof debugger at https://cn-geo1.uber.com/#1385906ValidInformation DisclosureLow2022-04-07–14
Information regarding trips from other users#127161ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-07-12–15
Missing authorization checks leading to the exposure of ubernihao.com administrator accounts#154762ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-08-15–15
Uber employees are sharing information on productforums.google.com#344086ValidInformation Disclosure–2021-02-25–16
Golang expvar Information Disclosure#1650035ValidInformation DisclosureLow2022-08-24–16
Possible to View Driver Waybill via Driver UUID#127087ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-06-14–24
Exposed█████████in apk file - devbuilds.uber.com#848905ValidInformation DisclosureHigh2021-04-09–28
API on campus-vtc.com allows access to ~100 Uber users full names, email addresses and telephone numbers.#580268ValidInformation DisclosureHigh2021-07-08$75035
phone number exposure for riders/drivers given email/uuid#225243ValidInformation Disclosure–2017-06-02–36
Critical Information disclosure of rtapi token for any user via https://video-support-staging.uber.com/video/api/getPopulousUser#953649ValidInformation DisclosureCritical2021-03-29–49
Open AWS S3 bucket at ubergreece.s3.amazonaws.com exposes confidential internal documents and files#361438ValidInformation Disclosure–2021-03-12$50070
Possibility to get private email using UUIDAnalysed#127158ValidInformation Disclosure–2016-06-15–82
private passenger information is exposed to the Uber Driver app during ride dispatch ("Ping") eventsAnalysed#174404ValidInformation Disclosure–2021-05-14–91
ubernycmarketplace.com is vulnerable to the Heartbleed BugAnalysed#304190ValidInformation Disclosure–2020-04-23$1,500112
Client secret, server tokens for developer applications returned by internal APIAnalysed#419655ValidInformation Disclosure–2019-02-08–125
[Pre-Submission][H1-4420-2019] API access to Phabricator on code.uberinternal.com from leaked certificate in git repoAnalysed#591813ValidInformation DisclosureCritical2021-02-25$40,000458
Sensitive user information disclosure at bonjour.uber.com/marketplace/_rpc via the 'userUuid' parameterAnalysed#542340ValidInformation DisclosureHigh2019-09-09–643

Status and severity are HackerOne's. “Access stated” is what the title says; “Access needed” and techniques come from CyberSIXT's analysis of the public report (1,199 analysed so far), which can be wrong. Data as of 2026-11-14.

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