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CVE-2020-16038.6HighCWE-710

CVE-2020-1603: Junos OS: Improper handling of specific IPv6 packets sent by clients eventually kernel crash (vmcore) the device.

Juniper Networks · Junos OS

Vendor fix available · Affected: Juniper Networks Junos OS · Exploitation: possible (1 to 10%)

Not in CyberSIXT coverage yet: no article names this CVE. This page shows the public record.

1.4%probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
72nd percentile
050100

Higher than 72% of scored CVEs

8.6HighCVSS 3.1
LowHigh

DescriptionCVE.org

Specific IPv6 packets sent by clients processed by the Routing Engine (RE) are improperly handled. These IPv6 packets are designed to be blocked by the RE from egressing the RE. Instead, the RE allows these specific IPv6 packets to egress the RE, at which point a mbuf memory leak occurs within the Juniper Networks Junos OS device. This memory leak eventually leads to a kernel crash (vmcore), or the device hanging and requiring a power cycle to restore service, creating a Denial of Service (DoS) condition. During the time where mbufs are rising, yet not fully filled, some traffic from client devices may begin to be black holed. To be black holed, this traffic must match the condition where this traffic must be processed by the RE. Continued receipt and attempted egress of these specific IPv6 packets from the Routing Engine (RE) will create an extended Denial of Service (DoS) condition. Scenarios which have been observed are: 1. In a single chassis, single RE scenario, the device will hang without vmcore, or a vmcore may occur and then hang. In this scenario the device needs to be power cycled. 2. In a single chassis, dual RE scenario, the device master RE will fail over to the backup RE. In this scenario, the master and the backup REs need to be reset from time to time when they vmcore. There is no need to power cycle the device. 3. In a dual chassis, single RE scenario, the device will hang without vmcore, or a vmcore may occur and then hang. In this scenario, the two chassis' design relies upon some type of network level redundancy - VRRP, GRES, NSR, etc. - 3.a In a commanded switchover, where nonstop active routing (NSR) is enabled no session loss is observed. 4. In a dual chassis, dual chassis scenario, rely upon the RE to RE failover as stated in the second scenario. In the unlikely event that the device does not switch RE to RE gracefully, then the fallback position is to the network level services scenario in the third scenario.

Affected products1

From the CVE record. A product or version that is not listed is unknown, not unaffected.

  • Juniper Networks · Junos OSfrom 16.1 before 16.1R7-S6; from 16.2 before 16.2R2-S11; from 17.1 before 17.1R2-S11, 17.1R3-S1; from 17.2 before 17.2R1-S9, 17.2R2-S8, 17.2R3-S3; from 17.3 before 17.3R3-S6; from 17.4 before 17.4R2-S9, 17.4R3 and 7 more

On the Atlas

Every published CVE is on the CyberSIXT Atlas, grouped by weakness, vendor and month.

Open the Atlas
Exploitation
Possible (1 to 10%). EPSS between 1% and 10%.
CISA KEV
Not listed
Public check
No public nuclei template
Published
January 2020

CoverageNo articles yet

No CyberSIXT article names CVE-2020-1603 yet, so there is no coverage timeline, action brief or change log for it. Everything on this page comes from the public CVE record, CISA KEV, EPSS and the nuclei template index. Search the archive or see the CVEs in the news.

References

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