Apache Kafka: Broker silently skips JWT signature verification for SASL/OAUTHBEARER when the JWKS endpoint URL is not configured
Apache Software Foundation · Apache Kafka
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DescriptionNVD
A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set. Impact: A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal including configured superusers and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by def
Coverage1 article · 1 outlet
First in our coverage: SecurityOnline, 29 Oct.
- Apache Kafka fixes 12 flaws, including a cluster access bypassSecurityOnline · first in our coverage
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