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CVE-2026-167608.8HighCWE-502

CVE-2026-16760: Fickling check_safety() bypass: likely_safe_imports grants module-origin trust to unvalidated standard library callables

trailofbits · fickling

Affected: trailofbits fickling · Exploitation: unlikely (under 1%)

Not in CyberSIXT coverage yet: no article names this CVE. This page shows the public record.

0.5%probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
39th percentile
050100

Higher than 39% of scored CVEs

8.8HighCVSS 3.1
LowHigh

DescriptionCVE.org

In Trail of Bits fickling through 0.1.12, the _process_import() method in fickle.py adds an imported name to the likely_safe_imports set whenever the source module is present in sys.stdlib_module_names and the name is absent from the UNSAFE_IMPORTS denylist, without inspecting what the name resolves to or how it behaves. The OvertlyBadEvals analysis pass in analysis.py then unconditionally skips any call whose function name appears in likely_safe_imports, including calls that would otherwise be flagged as overtly dangerous. As a result, any callable reachable through a non-blocked standard library module inherits module-level trust regardless of its own behavior, and check_safety() returns LIKELY_SAFE with zero findings for pickle payloads that reach code execution or file write through such callables. Demonstrated primitives: dataclasses._create_fn, which passes an attacker-controlled function body to exec() and yields arbitrary code execution on Python 3.7 through 3.12 (the internal _create_fn function was removed in Python 3.13); mailcap.findmatch, which internally calls os.system() on a test command taken from an attacker-controlled caps dictionary, yielding arbitrary code execution on Python versions through 3.12 (the mailcap module was removed in Python 3.13); and readline.add_history() followed by readline.write_history_file(), which writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path (POSIX platforms, where the readline module is available). fickling.load() chains check_safety() into pickle.loads() as an explicit security gate, so a LIKELY_SAFE verdict causes the payload to be deserialized and executed with the privileges of the victim process. The root cause is the inference of callable safety from module origin; it is independent of, and separately fixable from, the dotted __qualname__ resolution weakness tracked as CVE-2026-118938, which this advisory does not address.

Affected products1

From the CVE record. A product or version that is not listed is unknown, not unaffected.

  • trailofbits · ficklingup to and including 0.1.12

On the Atlas

Every published CVE is on the CyberSIXT Atlas, grouped by weakness, vendor and month.

Open the Atlas
Exploitation
Unlikely (under 1%). EPSS under 1%, or no score yet.
CISA KEV
Not listed
Public check
No public nuclei template
Published
October 2026

CoverageNo articles yet

No CyberSIXT article names CVE-2026-16760 yet, so there is no coverage timeline, action brief or change log for it. Everything on this page comes from the public CVE record, CISA KEV, EPSS and the nuclei template index. Search the archive or see the CVEs in the news.

References