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CVE-2026-91085Not scoredCWE-862

CVE-2026-91085: Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Apache Software Foundation · Apache Karaf

Vendor fix available · Affected: Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf · Exploitation: not established

ExploitationNot established

Not in CISA KEV as of catalogue 2026.11.13 (13 Nov)

  1. In CISA KEV: not seen
  2. Exploited (reported): not seen
  3. Scanning observed: not seen
  4. Proof of concept public: not seen
  5. Not establishedNothing in the sources we check
0.4%probability of exploitation in the next 30 days
31st percentile
050100

Higher than 31% of scored CVEs

Not scored yet. NVD has not published a CVSS score.

DescriptionNVD

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.

On the Atlas

Every published CVE is on the CyberSIXT Atlas, grouped by weakness, vendor and month.

Open the Atlas
Exploitation
Unlikely (under 1%). EPSS under 1%, or no score yet.
CISA KEV
Not listed
Public check
No public nuclei template

Coverage1 article · 1 outlet

First in our coverage: SecurityOnline, 29 Sep.

  1. Apache Karaf Flaws Let Low-Privilege Users Seize Admin Access
    SecurityOnline · first in our coverage · mentions it in passing

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References