Excerpt
1. Overview
In Part 1, I walked through the full delivery chain, from the ClickFix lure through the MSI package, both loader stages, and into the ti64 orchestrator. By the end, the syscall table was built, ntdll was unhooked, and TinyCallProxy64 was loaded into the runtime context. Everything was in place, but nothing had executed yet. This part picks up where that left off. The focus here is on what the orchestrator actually does, how it routes every syscall through an indirect call chain with full stack spoofing, how it selects its injection method, and how the final payload is deployed.
At a high level, executi…
The opening of the report, shown for reference. The full report, with its figures and indicators, is published by neso.re on neso.re.
More from neso.re2
- Borrowed Machinery: SnappyClient, HijackLoader, and a Shared Codebase?neso.re · Added 8 Sep
- ClickFix × HijackLoader: Dissecting a Live Stealer Campaign - Part 1neso.re · Added 28 Jul
On the same topics
- Vidar v1.5 in Go: same family, new language, heavy sandbox checksderp.ca · Published 16 May
- StealC Is Back, and This Time It's a RATVaronis · Published 22 Oct
- Threat Group Cards: A Threat Actor EncyclopediaETDA Threat Group Cards · Added 25 Oct
- GhostAction Attackers Plant Credential Stealer Disguised as Font in 94 GitHub RepositoriesThe Hacker News · Published 19 Oct