Security AffairsPierluigi Paganini
Enea links SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA to telecom spying
Part of the LIMINAL PANDA story · since 12 Nov
- Thu 12 Nov, 15:00 UTC. Infosecurity, first report. Enea links SilentAir to attacks intercepting Taiwanese calls.
- Mon 16 Nov, 10:00 UTC. Security Affairs, its first report on the story. Enea links SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA to telecom spying. This article, 2nd of 2.
Telecom security firm Enea has published details of two threat groups, SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA, believed to be operating inside mobile networks to spy on subscribers and intercept calls and text messages. In a report lead by Enea, researchers describe SilentAir as a state-like actor that compromises mobile operators in at least six Asian countries and targets subscribers in around a dozen others, including political figures in Taiwan.
LIMINAL PANDA has been linked to a malware family known as GTPDoor, with a newer version, GTPDoor v3, said to hide in GTP-U to evade detection, while continuing to use the XOR key and libpcap to capture traffic. Enea notes that GTP-U is used in 5G networks, making the threat relevant to modern mobile infrastructure. The groups’ activities, seen since early 2026, include covert sessions that move laterally inside operator networks, launch SSH, check health, and delete or alter timestamps to hide traces.
Enea asserts it has directly observed or strongly suspected 5–10 infected operators, and believes several dozen operators worldwide may be affected.
The analysis, which cross-references prior disclosures about SS7, Diameter, and GTP-based attacks, attributes most interception activity to SilentAir’s operations, with a smaller proportion tied to LIMINAL PANDA’s tooling and traffic.
Enea reports that SilentAir relies on compromised network nodes to intercept traffic, including sending silent SMS messages to test interception, while LIMINAL PANDA’s GTPDoor communicates with attackers via the GTP-C and GTP-U protocols to start and stop data tunnels and exfiltrate data.
In response, Enea recommends deploying GTP-C and GTP-U firewalls that share information with SS7 and Diameter security tools, monitoring internal traffic with tools like SIGTRANslator and Cordscan, and integrating telecom security with IT security. The researchers emphasise that the IPX interconnect must be treated as untrusted, and caution that attackers can exploit a range of interconnect protocols beyond the well-known SS7 and Diameter.
How the story developed
2 articles from 2 outlets since 12 Nov. Picked up again on 16 Nov after 4 days quiet. This was the 2nd report, 4 days after the first.
- Thu 12 Nov, 15:00 UTC. Infosecurity, first report. Enea links SilentAir to attacks intercepting Taiwanese calls.
- Mon 16 Nov, 10:00 UTC. Security Affairs, its first report on the story. Enea links SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA to telecom spying. This article, 2nd of 2.
- No CVE
- Larger: an outlet’s first report
- Coverage over time
- Quiet time, folded
Show all 2 articles as a listHide the list
- Thu 12 NovDay 01
- Enea links SilentAir to attacks intercepting Taiwanese calls15:00 · Infosecurity · First report
Quiet for 4 days
Mon 16 NovDay 41- Enea links SilentAir and LIMINAL PANDA to telecom spying10:00 · Security Affairs · Picked up again · This article, 2nd of 2