Envoyproxy · weakness class
Denial of Service
24 CVEs
Every dot is a CVE in what this vendor ships; the named ones are the most at risk.
- likely to be exploited
- 1
Every one of the 24 is a mark on the map. Named now: 1 to 24, most at risk first.
- Upon receiving each incoming request header data, Envoy will iterate over existing request headers to verify that the total size of the headers stays below a maximum limit. The im…
- In Envoy through 1.11.1, users may configure a route to match incoming path headers via the libstdc++ regular expression implementation. A remote attacker may send a request with…
- Envoy 1.12.0 allows a remote denial of service because of resource loops, as demonstrated by a single idle TCP connection being able to keep a worker thread in an infinite busy lo…
- CNCF Envoy through 1.13.0 may consume excessive amounts of memory when proxying HTTP/1.1 requests or responses with many small (i.e. 1 byte) chunks.
- CNCF Envoy through 1.13.0 may consume excessive amounts of memory when responding internally to pipelined requests.
- An issue was discovered in Envoy 1.14.0. There is a remotely exploitable crash for HTTP2 Metadata, because an empty METADATA map triggers a Reachable Assertion.
- Envoy version 1.14.2, 1.13.2, 1.12.4 or earlier is susceptible to increased memory usage in the case where an HTTP/2 client requests a large payload but does not send enough windo…
- Envoy vulnerable to HTTP/2 memory leak in nghttp2 codec
- Zip bomb vulnerability in Envoy
- Envoy version 1.14.2, 1.13.2, 1.12.4 or earlier may exhaust file descriptors and/or memory when accepting too many connections.
- Envoy version 1.14.2, 1.13.2, 1.12.4 or earlier may consume excessive amounts of memory when processing HTTP/1.1 headers with long field names or requests with long URLs.
- Envoy version 1.14.2, 1.13.2, 1.12.4 or earlier may consume excessive amounts of memory when proxying HTTP/2 requests or responses with many small (i.e. 1 byte) data frames.
- Reachable assertion in Envoy
- Excessive CPU utilization when closing HTTP/2 streams
- Crash when a cluster is deleted in Envoy
- Envoy vulnerable to HTTP/2 memory exhaustion via cookie header size bypass and HPACK amplification
- Envoy Gateway: OCI layer extraction allocates make([]byte, h.Size) from untrusted tar header
- Envoy Gateway: Wasm HTTP fetch decompresses gzip without output-size limit
- Envoy may crash when a large request body is processed in Lua filter
- Envoy can enter an endless loop while decompressing Brotli data with extra input
- Envoy: HTTP/2 Discarded Host Header 200 GB Header-Copy OOM in Envoy
- Excessive CPU usage when URI template matcher is configured using regex in Envoy
- Envoy Zstd Decompressor: Ratio Check at Wrong Loop Depth lead to memory explosion
- Envoy OOM vector from HTTP async client with unbounded response buffer for mirror response
exploited in the wildcheck availableringed, named or not: CyberSIXT has reported on it
Zoom in on the map and the dots under the middle of it are named where they are.
Data as of 2026-11-15. CVE List through 2026-11-15 · EPSS of 2026-11-14 · CISA KEV checked 2026-11-15. Sources: the CVE List, CISA KEV, EPSS, NVD, nuclei templates and public bug bounty data.