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CVE-2026-835948.3High

Apache Wicket: FileUploadToResourceField accepts a client-asserted upload result and allocates the size it names

Apache Software Foundation · Apache Wicket

Not in CISA KEVVendor fix available

No EPSS score yet. The score appears once FIRST publishes it.

8.3HighCVSS
LowHigh

DescriptionNVD

Memory allocation with an excessive size value in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.FileUploadToResourceField uploads files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a form, and is told the outcome afterwards over its own Ajax callback. That callback reads the request parameter filesInfo, a JSON array carrying a client file name, a size and a content type for each file, and turns it into the list of FileUploadToResourceField.UploadInfo that onUploadSuccess() receives. Nothing binds that JSON to an upload the resource performed and nothing re-derives it from the stored files, so the number of entries and every value in them are whatever the request supplied. The callback URL is rendered into the page, no prior upload is required, and both GET and POST reach it, so any client that can load the page can have the component report files that were never uploaded, without authenticating beyond whatever the page itself requires and without any user interaction. UploadInfo#get(), which the class offers as the way to obtain the bytes of an upload, allocates a byte array from UploadInfo#getSize() before it opens the file. The array is therefore siz

Coverage1 article · 1 outlet

First in our coverage: SecurityOnline, 2 Nov.

  1. Apache Wicket fixes 19 flaws across three supported releases
    SecurityOnline · first in our coverage · mentions it in passing

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References

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