LUKSO email recovery flaw lets attacker drain 300 profiles
Part of the LUKSO story · since 18 Nov
- Wed 18 Nov, 12:39 UTC. cybersixt, first report. LUKSO email recovery flaw lets attacker drain 300 profiles. This article, 1st of 1.
LUKSO, the blockchain built around "Universal Profile" smart-contract accounts, says an attacker exploited a security hole in the backend of its email-based recovery service overnight from 17 to 18 November, took control of about 300 Universal Profiles and moved around 1.4 million LYX, the network's native token, out of them. In a post-mortem published on 18 November, LUKSO says the attacker bridged the full amount to Ethereum and swapped it through decentralised exchanges such as Uniswap for about 50 ETH, worth about $95,000, which now sits at the address 0x4d2BFb7Ca38Cb3Ea136845a9dd0FBEACe2Cd365C. It has switched the email-based recovery system off and is decommissioning it, and it says no new profiles can be affected.
How the attack worked
The email-based recovery service helped users regain access to their profiles. According to LUKSO, the backend flaw let the attacker take control of the service's own "recovery" Universal Profiles, which sat on users' profiles as controllers, and use them to add the attacker's key, 0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7, as a controller on about 300 profiles. That key was then used to move assets out. LUKSO first warned users to remove it at 07:26 UTC on 18 November.
LUKSO says the LUKSO blockchain and the Universal Profile smart contracts were never affected and worked as designed, that no private keys or recovery phrases leaked, and that profiles that did not use email recovery were never at risk. It says its file-based and device-keychain backups are secure. It has not described the backend flaw itself.
What affected users should do
Anyone who used email recovery can check whether their profile was affected with LUKSO's incident checker. Until the attacker's key is removed it can still move whatever is left on a profile, including tokens and collectibles. LUKSO's steps, in order, are to open the UP Authorize app, paste the attacker's address into the "Authorize controller" field, connect the profile and remove the key, even if it does not appear in the controller list; then remove the "recovery-UP" controller, or its permission to add permissions, in the UP! mobile app or browser extension; then create a file backup of the profile. LUKSO says it will never ask for a recovery phrase and that support requests go to support@lukso.network.
Because a Universal Profile's keys are separate from the account, owners who remove the attacker's key keep the profile, its name, history and followers, and any remaining assets, LUKSO says. It is working on a way to reimburse affected users and will share details on its official channels in the coming weeks.
What is not known
LUKSO has not said what the hole in its recovery backend was, how the attacker found it, exactly when the attack began, or whether it has contacted law enforcement. It gives approximate figures for the profiles affected and the LYX taken, and it has not said how many profiles lost funds or how much each lost.
How the story developed
1 article from 1 outlet since 18 Nov. Still developing; the latest report was 6 hours ago. This was the first report.
- Wed 18 Nov, 12:39 UTC. cybersixt, first report. LUKSO email recovery flaw lets attacker drain 300 profiles. This article, 1st of 1.
- No CVE
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- LUKSO email recovery flaw lets attacker drain 300 profiles12:39 · cybersixt · First report · This article, 1st of 1
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